AKM capture device by Harwell, William D.
N87-29862
AKM CAPTURE DEVICE
William D. IIarwell*
Introduction
The Westar and Palapa satellites were built by Hughes Aircraft of
California. They were both of the Hughes HS376 series and identical in
external configuration. Both satellites were launched from the orbiting
Shuttle during mission STS 41-B in February, 1984. Soon after launch, the
Payload Assist Modules on both satellites failed, placing them in useless
orbits. In an effort to recover them and the considerable investment each
satellite represented, NASA and Hughes undertook the Satellite Retrieval
Mission. The mechanism used to capture each of the errant satellites was the
AKM (Apogee Kick Motor) Capture Device (ACD) - also referred to as the
"Stinger".
Mechanism Requirements
The AKM Capture Device (ACD) had three interface requirements: interface
with the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) for transportation to and stabilization
of the spacecrafts; interface with each satellite for retrieval; and finally,
interface with the Shuttle's Remote Manipulator System (RMS or "robot arm")
for satellite transport back to the Orbiter's payload bay. The majority of
the design requirements were associated with the capture and release of the
satellites. In addition to these unique requirements th_ _.......i _,_"A
(Extra-Vehir,,1 .......!_ti.i_j_, _-to grapple, and RMS manipulation requirements
applied. These requirements included thermal, glare, snag, RMS runaway and
crewman safety considerations. Finally, a host of contingency features were
also needed.
Mechanism Description
The "Stinger" was an EVA crewman operated device which attached to the
arms of the MMU. So configured, the crewman flew the MMU/Stinger assemblage
from the payload bay to the spinning satellite and aligned himself with the
spin axis of the satellite's motor nozzle. He then flew the probe of the
Stinger into the nozzle, through the throat, and into the empty motor casing.
By actuating a lever on the ACD's control box, a debris cover extended -
releasing three independently sprung toggle fingers inside the motor casing.
This constituted a "soft-dock." The crewman then operated a threaded shaft
which retracted the probe, bringing its fingers into contact with the material
surrounding the nozzle throat, as shown in figure I. The retraction also
brought the Stinger's 41 inch diameter ring into contact with the satellite's
separation ring, creating a compressive loading of the satellite's nozzle
throat and separation ring. This constituted "hard-dock." The astronaut then
*NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas°
55
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19870020429 2020-03-20T10:03:39+00:00Z
n 
a 
W 
(3 
(3 z 
W 
I 
Y a 
OF POOR QU._,_L_ag
used the MMU's propulsion system and onboard logic to stabilize the satellite
for RMS grapple.
Once the satellite was grappled and returned to the payload bay, a
number of tasks were performed to prepare it for berthing. Upon completion of
these tasks, the crewman actuated a lever which released the probe from the
end of the Stinger. The probe remained in the motor casing for the remainder
of the mission. The astronaut then re-stowed the remainder of the ACD.
ACD Mechanisms and Controls
The AKM Capture Device (ACD) is comprised of a number of component
mechanisms and mechanical controls. These are grouped into four major
assemblies (see figure 2), which are; the Probe, Control Box, Support
Structure, and Grapple Fixture. Each will be discussed individually.
PROBE ASSEMBLY
The Probe Assembly consists of the following components:
Toggle Finger and Block Assembly
Debris Cover
Debris Cover/Toggle Finger Release Mechanism
Control Box Interface
Toggle Finger and Block Assembly - Three toggle fingers spaced radially
around a circular pivot block comprised this assembly. Each finger
rotated independently about its pivot from the bias of a torsion spring,
Lh_L_by _iic_eas_n_ _ne re±lao1_iEy or _ne assembly. Any single _Inger
was capable of withstanding the loads generated during the capture and
handling. Thus, a three-fold failure (no finger opening) had to occur to
prevent the preliminary capture or "soft-dock" and subsequent
"hard-dock". In addition, the torsion springs which controlled the
fingers were sized such that the Manned Maneuvering Unit's (MMU's)
thrusters could override and close them if the astronaut prematurely
deployed the debris cover prior to penetrating the throat.
Debris Cover - The debris cover was necessary for several reasons. The
first was due to uncertainties about the condition of the nozzle throat.
The throat was made of a carbon composite which deteriorated to some
extent as the fuel was burned. The possibility that particles remaining
in the area of the throat could contaminate the ACD toggle assembly and
reduce the chances of capturing the satellites dictated the need to
protect the toggle assembly. Secondly, the debris cover was given a
conical leading profile to help guide the ACD as the probe traveled along
the nozzle and through the throat. Finally, the debris cover encased the
toggle fingers prior to deployment. Each toggle finger was biased to
rotate outward as the cover opened.
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Debris Cover/Toggle Finger Release Mechanism - The debris cover was attached
to a shaft which was deployed by a preloaded compression spring. The end
of the shaft was held by a pair of latches which were actuated by a rod
in the control box. When actuated, the rod opened the latches releasing
the shaft and debris cover, and thereby, the toggle fingers.
Control Box Interface - Each of the satellites were spinning about their
axes as they floated in space. The MMU's arms were not designed to
withstand the torque associated with despinning the satellites. In an
effort to reduce this torque, it was specified that the probe assembly
not transmit any torque. This required that it be attached to the
control box by a rotating interface. To simplify the design, it was also
decided the toggle fingers would not be closed once deployed. Instead,
the Stingers' probe assemblies would remain in the satellites. They
could be removed rather easily by hand once the satellites were returned
to earth. This required that the probe assembly be removeable. Finally,
the actuator rod from the control box had to enter the probe to operate
the Debris Cover/Toggle Finger Release Mechanism. To accomodate these
requirements the shouldered interface on the end of the probe was
designed - see figure 2. This interface will be discussed further in the
control box portion of this paper.
CONTROL BOX
The ACD's control box was designed primarily for the purposes of
deploying the toggle fingers, applying the clamping load, and releasing the
probe assembly. However, in addition to these primary functions, several
contingency features were provided. Each will be discussed in this section.
Th_ rnnt_nl h_Y T.T_]I ko 6r_o_ An.m 4.+^ _6^ ¢^11^.._ .... _^--^ _ ............
............... 0 _J ........ _
discussion:
Probe Actuator System
Retractor System
Probe Release System
Probe Actuator System - the function of this system was to deploy the debris
cover, thereby releasing the toggle fingers. System elements included
the actuator rod, the connecting linkage, and the toggle lever.
Operationally, the astronaut would pull the toggle lever at the
appropriate time, causing the actuator rod to enter the opening at the
end of the probe. Inside the probe, the actuator rod opened latches
which held the debris cover shaft. A preloaded compression spring in the
probe then extended the cover - a motion which also released the toggle
fingers. The secondary responsibilities of this system were to verify
the cover had extended and to overcome any binding of the debris cover
that may have occurred. The total rotation of the toggle lever was 60
degrees. Of this, the first 15 degrees of motion fired the debris cover.
The remaining rotation drove the actuator rod into the cavity the debris
cover shaft had vacated, verifying (by the absence of the shaft)
deployment of the cover and toggle fingers. Any resistance to complete
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rotation of the toggle lever indicated the cover did not open completely,
if at all. By applying force to the toggle lever the crewman could force
the actuator rod forward against the end of the debris cover shaft. This
relieved any binding that might have occurred, thereby deploying the
cover.
Retractor System - To provide clearance for the toggle fingers to swing
outward and to accomodate variances within the throat's surface, the
trailing end of the debris cover traveled approximately 4 inches past the
plane of the inner throat before its deployment. When the fingers
opened, the Stinger and satellite were loosely, but positively coupled.
To complete the capture, this coupling had to be rigidlzed. By
retracting the probe into the barrel of the control box, the fingers
engaged the material surrounding the throat as the support structure ring
came into contact with the satellite's separation ring. The components
of the retractor system accomplished this task.
The retractor consisted of a large threaded shaft with a speed disk and
a ratcheting, break-over torque wrench on the control box end. The other
end was connected through the probe release system to the probe. The
initial probe retraction was accomplished by rotating the speed disk, a
large circular wheel, until the fingers contacted the throat. This
eliminated a significant amount of ratcheting. The final
Stinger-to-satellite rigidization was accomplished by operating the
torque wrench until it broke over - indicating that a preset clamping
force had been achieved. Finally, the retraction system served as a
backup to the probe release system. This feature will be discussed in
the next section.
Probe Release System - To rigidly attach the probe to the control box while
permitting it to rotate, as discussed in the probe's control box
interface section, a unique arrangement was implemented. Three, 3/8 inch
bearing balls were placed in slots, equidistantly spaced around a bearing
sleeve (see figure 3). A second sleeve, the retainer sleeve, slid over
the bearing sleeve. A portion of each ball protruded through the inner
diameter of the bearing sleeve when the retainer sleeve was closed.
These ball segments fit radially around the groove on the end of the
probe, preventing it from coming out. The inner diameter of the bearing
sleeve and a close tolerance bushing held the probe concentrically in the
control box barrel. When the probe release lever was pushed forward, the
retainer sleeve slid back. This exposed a groove in the retainer sleeve
which permitted the balls to travel out into their respective slots as
the probe was removed. Thus, the probe release system provided probe
containment while acting as a bearing.
A normal probe release has just been described. However,
contingency provisions were made for the situation in which the probe
binds and will not release. The probe release system, as mentioned
earlier, was connected to the large retractor screw in the control box.
When the ACD is securely clamped to the satellite, the retractor is
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PROBE RELEASE SYSTEM 
capable of retracting the probe several more inches. If the probe does
not sllp out of the control box barrel as planned, further operation of
the torque wrench will forcibly withdraw the bearing sleeve from the end
of the probe, provided the retainer sleeve is slid back. Since the ACD
removal from the satellite was necessary for mission success a third
method of removal was also incorporated. It involved the removal of the
support structure from the control box and will be discussed in the
support structure section of this paper.
ACD SUPPORT STRUCTURE
During transportation back to the Shuttle and preparation for berthing,
RMS manipulations caused a variety of forces, torques, and moments to be
exerted on the ACD. These loads were the results of accelerating and
decelerating the satellite, ACD, MMU, and suited crewman combination about the
payload bay. Of greater significance was the possibility that while connected
to the RMS, an arm runaway could occur. The significantly higher loads that a
runaway could create represented the worst load case, and therefore, became
the design load criteria by which the support structure was designed. Other
considerations in the support structure's design were the MMU's arm bracket
and ACD control box interfaces and the protection of the satellite's
separation ring.
The ACD's MMU interface was a simple bracket design which mated with the
existing MMU arm brackets. The control box interface, however, required a
stable attachment of the support structure to the control box which could be
easily disassembled for contingency purposes, should the probe not release
from the ACD. The separation ring on the bottom of the satellite was the
means by which the berthing hardware was attached. If the stinger could not
be removed, the spacecraft could not be returned to earth. The control box
interface consisted of a cradle into which the control box assembly slid and
two attach bolts. The bolt heads mated with the power screwdriver - a battery
operated EVA screwdriver capable of generating high torques. If required the
bolts and, thus, the structure could be removed from the control box. The
entire control box and probe assembly could then be pushed into the motor
casing and nozzle, providing clearance for the satellite berthing adapter.
It was specified that the satellite's aluminum separation ring not be
damaged during capture. Relative motion between it and the ACD's ring during
retrieval could create surface damage that could prevent or hinder proper
attachment of the berthing adapter. To eliminate this possiblility, four
spring-loaded silicone rubber pads were added to the support structure's legs.
As the ACD was tightened on the satellite, these pads came into contact with
the separation ring, precluding any damage.
GRAPPLE FIXTURE
Issues arose concerning MMU propellant consumption, time required to
transport a satellite back to the payload bay by means of the MMU, possible
throat deterioration, and the need to effectively handle the satellite while
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it was prepared for berthing. Two satellites were to be captured. A
considerable amount of propellant would be expended if the astronaut were to
fly out to each spacecraft, capture and stablize it, and return each to the
Shuttle by means of a single MMU (the second MMU was primarily a backup unit).
Additionally, this process required a considerable amount of time in a
timeline which was already very long. The possiblity of throat deterioration,
as previously noted, was present since the carbon throat was thought to be
brittle. Forces generated during transportation could cause some throat
breakage and subsequent lack of handling control of the satellite. Finally,
once back in the payload bay, the satellite had to be manipulated to prepare
it for berthing. This required some stable means of supporting the
spacecraft.
These concerns prompted the decision to use the Shuttle's Remote
Manipulator System (RMS) to transport and manipulate the MMU/ACD/satellite/
crewman assemblage. To accomodate RMS capture, a flight standard grapple
fixture was attached to the support structure of the Stinger. Once the
satellite was captured and stabilized, the RMS operator grappled the
assemblage and returned it to the Orbiter. During the berthing preparations,
the MMU crewman remained in place, continually monitoring the satellite for
excessive movement which would indicate throat deterioration. If excessive
motion occurred, he would operate the torque wrench on the ACD's control box,
applying more compressive loading. This, in turn, would rigidize the
spacecraft/ACD interface to bring the satellite back under control.
Conclusion
[ne ACD's were designed, fabricated and certified in seven months. In
November of 1984, during two separate EVA's on misson STS 51-A, two separate
Stingers were used to sucessfully capture the Westar and the Palapa
satellites. They were returned to earth and refurbished (by Hughes Aircraft)
for resale.
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